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The institutional changes which emerged from the liberal revolution in 
Western Europe were beneficial for economic growth. The concept of 
equality before the law, the simplification of the judiciary, more clearly 
defined property rights, and the opening of the market all contributed to a 
rapid approximation of the expected improvements in private returns with 
the increase in social returns. This article examines the institutional changes 
that took place in nineteenth-century Spain and concludes that deficiencies 
in the process of reform introduction led to smaller gains for economic 
growth than might have been expected.  
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Los cambios ·institucionales que definieron la revolución liberal en 
Occidente tuvieron efectos positivos sobre el crecimiento económico. La 
igualdad de los individuos ante la ley, la simplificación de la administración 
de justicia, la definición clara de los derechos de propiedad y la apertura 
del mercado contribuyeron a una rápida aproximación entre las 
expectativas de una mayor rentabilidad individual y el logro del incremento 
de rentabilidad social. En el presente artículo se examina el cambio 
institucional operado en la España del siglo XIX, y se concluye con la 
afirmación de que los defectos en su práctica no aportaron todas las 
consecuencias favorables al crecimiento económico que cabía esperar del 
nuevo sistema. 
Palabras clave: Revolución liberal, cambios institucionales, 




l.  INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, LIBERALISM AND ECONOMIC 
MODERNIZATION 
There is widespread agreement about the positive consequences that the 
adoption of a liberal political system has for the modern economic growth 
of a given society. Without attempting to make a comprehensive list of such 
consequences, it is worth highlighting the possible effects of some of the 
institutional changes inherent in this model of society.1 
Since the times of Adam Smith, it has been generally accepted that 
market expansion leads to economic specialization, and this, in turn, 
generates increases in productivity, thanks mainly to economies of scale. 
Market activity existed at least twenty-four or twenty-five centuries before 
the triumph of mercantilism in Northern Europe, the French Revolution, or 
the independence of the United States. It is, however, undeniable that the 
implantation of the liberal model of society made a decisive contribution to 
the broadening of the market -this was the case in Spain- when the legal 
barriers that prevented the transfer of properties belonging to certain 
institutions, such as the Church or entailed estates of the nobility 
(mayorazgos), were removed. 
                                                          
1 A first version of this study was presented at the tribute to Professor Miguel Artola that took 
place at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid in March 1993. That version was published by 
A.M. Bernal et al. (1994). The author is grateful for all the comments and criticisms received, 
especially those of Concepción de Castro and other participants at the Contemporary History 
Seminar held in March 1994, at the Ortega y Gasset Foundation. 
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The common effects of the liberal revolution in western societies have 
included unified legal frameworks and the equality of individuals before 
institutions. The elimination of regulatory or legal peculiarities specific to 
a region or social class resulted in a clear reduction in the transaction costs 
of market activity. Thus, the generalization of the decimal metric system, 
the suppression of specific judicial procedures for the nobility, the 
universality of legal codes, the disappearance of internal customs and 
currency unification all served to encourage trading activity.  
Two observations should, however, be made. The first refers to the 
potential conflict that may arise in a society with legal peculiarities if these 
are suppressed for the sake of greater uniformity with the rest of the regions 
and communities; in other words, as a result of the normative homogeneity 
the liberal State is attempting to impose. For the case of Spain, the socio-
political consequences set in motion by the suppression of certain 
jurisdictional privileges and charters provide a clear illustration of this.2 
The second observation refers precisely to the appearance of transaction 
costs that affect the economic relations between economic subjects, and 
which depend largely on the institutional system. In our opinion, the way 
in which the liberal revolution was carried out in different nations could 
have influenced the appearance of such costs.  
Many experts have investigated these issues, both from a theoretical 
and a historical point of view; this has led to a rethinking of some of the 
assumptions made by neoclassical analysis. As North and Thomas explain, 
the growth of per capita income, the true measure of economic growth, 
depends on two conditions. The first is an increase in the per capita 
quantities of the productive factors. The second is increased efficiency of 
one or more of the factors of production. The latter will result from 
economies of scale, due to increases in the quality of the factors such as an 
improvement in human capital resulting from more education or job 
training, or physical capital thanks to new technology, or to reductions in 
market imperfections, for example, uncertainty and information costs, or to 
changes in economic organization.3 North recently insisted that the 
existence of transaction or entry costs runs contrary to the hypothesis of 
economic growth based exclusively on the integration of economic units in 
broad markets and free access to technology.4 
Transaction costs appear in all market relationships, but their magnitude 
will depend on the institutional system in place. Some transaction costs are 
ex ante (drafting of contracts, negotiation, the search for bidders or 
applicants, access to market information) and others are ex post (price 
                                                          
2 Artola (1978), pp. 280-282. 
3 North and Thomas (1971), pp. 777-803, North (1984), pp. 18-19. 
4 North (1990), p. 135. 
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negotiation, damages for breach of contract, insurance and requests for 
party or governmental support of an agreement).5 Regarding the equality of 
opportunities of individuals before the law, our current focus, as a 
consequence of the liberal reform the greater the potential pressure of 
certain individuals or groups on the institutions that set the rules or settle 
conflicts, the greater the probability that transaction costs will increase. 
Obviously, the introduction of regulations that contribute to reducing such 
costs, as well as competent social bodies able to monitor compliance with 
these regulations - and sanction non-compliance with - is one of the basic 
functions of the State and has very clear effects on economic growth. This 
is not limited to the generation of effective social mechanisms to make sure 
that contracts are duly respected or to avoid monopolistic practices by 
individuals or pressure groups. Social investments aimed at minimizing 
information and entry costs, for example education, should also be 
included. Instruction, whether public or private, affects the possibility and 
ability to participate in exchanges, as well as productive capacity. 
The liberal revolution brought with it a characteristic definition of 
property rights, in which individual rights become especially important, but 
without implying the disappearance of communal or collective rights.6 
According to North and Thomas, the defence and protection of property 
rights in a liberal system are the responsibility of the State, given that this 
is cheaper for the State than it would be for any individual or private group.7 
In any case, clearly defined property rights tend to stimulate investment on 
the part of the owners, or users, of productive resources and will move the 
potential profit rate of the economic system closer to the effective one or, 
as Eggertsson says, bring the structural production frontier closer to the 
technical production frontier.8 
Obviously, poorly defined property rights -whether individual or 
collective- will have the opposite effects. Investment, in this case, will be 
held back and the possibilities of economic growth will be lower than those 
permitted by access to the available technology and financial resources. 
In addition to market expansion, the legal equality of individuals, the 
reduction of transaction and entry costs, and more clearly defined property 
rights, there is one last aspect of institutional change - in the case of liberal 
reform - to consider in relation to economic change. It concerns a society’s 
choice of tax system and of specific levels of fiscal pressure, as well as, at 
the same time, deciding exactly how public spending is assigned according 
                                                          
5 Williamson (1985), pp. 25-32, and Eggertsson (1990), pp. 101-102. 
6 Alchian and Demsetz (1973), pp. 16-27. 
7 North and Thomas (1973), pp. 5-16. 
8 Eggertsson (1970), p. 319. 
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to defined functions and bodies. The consolidation of the idea of popular 
sovereignty comes together here with the awareness that the State must 
have specific resources at its disposal to meet social needs, without other 
powers -the Church, the nobility- having the ability to collect revenue and 
determine collective spending. It is not by chance that fiscal issues are at 
the root of some of the most significant liberal revolutions; neither is it a 
coincidence that some of the most eminent historians of liberalism dedicate 
considerable effort to the study of the transition of the Treasuries of the 
Ancien Régime to modern tax systems. Without effective control by society 
of the ways in which tax revenues are used, and the consequent 
quantification and distribution of public spending, the creation of 
institutional mechanisms capable of guaranteeing the legal equality of 
citizens and reducing transaction costs would not be possible. Conversely, 
it is also true that, without effective equality of opportunity and without 
institutions capable of correcting injustices or errors in the development of 
social activity, the creation of a sufficiently fair fiscal system would be 
unlikely. This leads us to the observation that the institutional changes 
inherent in liberal reform depend on each other. 
 
 
2.   INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN SPANISH LIBERALISM 
It is difficult to verify the consequences that the institutional changes of 
liberalism had on the economic modernization of Spain in the 19th century. 
Firstly, and from a general methodological point of view, as critics of the 
new institutional history observed at an early stage, it is difficult to provide 
explanations for the interconnection between political or social factors and 
those of an economic nature using quantitative procedures. It is, then, not 
easy to put forward a rigorous definition of a precise causal relationship 
between an institutional variable and another of an economic nature; all the 
more so when univocal reactions of subjects or groups in the face of the 
same historical changes do not exist.9 Secondly, and moving to the specific 
case of Spain, it must be considered that the institutional creation of 
liberalism was a slow and contradictory process; its chronological limits 
being found in the Cortes de Cádiz, on the one hand, and in the Glorious 
Revolution (1868-1874), on the other. Thirdly, the liberal revolution in 
Spain coincided with two other important historical changes. One of these 
changes was the loss of almost all the American territories between 1810 
and 1824, the economic consequences of which opened an interesting 
debate.10 On the other hand, Spain experienced a long, almost 
uninterrupted, period of wars lasting thirty years, from the confrontation of 
the monarchy of Carlos IV with the French Convention to the unsuccessful 
                                                          
9 Fishlow and Fogel (1971). 
10 Sardá (1987); Fontana (1970), 1971), (1982) and (1991); Prados de la Escosura (1993). 
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efforts to contain the Spanish-American emancipation movement. Josep 
Fontana clearly quantified the financial cost of these wars. In 1808, before 
the confrontation with the Napoleonic armies, the accumulated internal 
debt of the State was 7,198.7 million reales of which 71.2% corresponded 
to the reign of Carlos IV (from 1788 to 1808) during which the wars against 
France and England took place. In 1820, the State's internal debt had almost 
doubled, reaching 13,120.5 million reales. Of this amount, 48.1%, that is, 
6,305.8 million reales corresponded, according to Fontana, to unpaid 
expenses during the War of Independence and to interest payments pending 
on the public debt. After 1828, more than 7,000 million reales disappeared 
from the calculation of the internal debt without justification; this could be 
explained by the unilateral and arbitrary liquidation by the government of 
the obligations contracted at the end of the Ancien Régime with its national 
creditors, especially with the suppliers of the armies who had fought in the 
War of Independence.11 This leads us to two conclusions: on the one hand, 
the cost of financing the wars at the end of the Ancien Régime fell unequally 
on the various taxpayers and economic sectors of the nation; on the other 
hand, despite the abrupt reduction of the debt at the end of the 1820s, 
Spanish society would still have to shoulder a heavy financial burden for 
many decades. This means that, coinciding with the possible consequences 
of political change, the Spanish economy of the 19th century would 
experience, simultaneously, the effects – even in the short and medium term 
- of Spanish-American emancipation and of the State’s indebtedness, with 
this financial burden probably representing more than 150% of the national 
income of the late eighteenth century.12 Naturally, in addition to the effects 
brought about by these changes, we must also underline the marked 
influence that population growth, links with international markets, capital 
inflows, and the adoption of modern technology had on the evolution of the 
economy in the 19th century. This all means that it is practically impossible 
to even attempt to quantify the consequences of institutional change on the 
Spanish economy; we can, at least, put forward some explanatory 
hypotheses. In order to establish these hypotheses, an attempt will be made 
to relate some of the observations and deductions explained by the new 
institutional historians with the interpretations that some contemporary 
historians have presented regarding the liberal reforms in Spain. 
In order to define precisely our objective, the economic consequences 
of the institutional change brought about by the liberal revolution, we can 
focus on the period 1833-1875; that is, from the regency of Queen María 
Cristina, when Isabel II was a minor, to the Restoration of Alfonso XII. In 
this period, the deflationary effects of the interruption of trade with the 
American continent had already been overcome, and, as previously 
                                                          
11 Fontana (1973), pp. 198-228, and Fontana and Garrabou (1986), p. 102. 
12 The data are from the calculations of Prados de la Escosura (1993), pp. 271-176. 
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mentioned, most of the financial burdens incurred at the end of the Ancien 
Régime had been eliminated swiftly.13 
We will now examine how the main institutional changes of the liberal 
reform in Spain which could have affected economic growth were carried 
out; these included market expansion, the equality of all individuals before 
the law, a redefinition of property rights, reduced transaction and entry 
costs, and the fact that State income and spending were determined by the 
citizens’ representatives.14  
The expansion of the market as a result of the liberal revolution took 
various forms in Spain. The suppression of the guilds and the disappearance 
of the Mesta helped to eliminate barriers in the land market and the 
manufacturing sector. It was, however, above all, the land disentailment 
process, initiated in 1798, followed by the abolition of entailed estates in 
1836 which became definitive in 1841 (although prolonged until the second 
half of the 19th century), the process that liberalized the real estate market. 
It can be assumed that Spanish agriculture expanded during the first half of 
the 19th century, that is, during the period when Church property was 
confiscated.15 As observed by Gonzalo Anes, this permitted an increase in 
population, alongside a trade policy involving the export of food products. 
The population grew by almost 35% between 1800 and 1857. The same 
author reminds us that the Church owned the best land and that, according 
to some testimonies, much ecclesiastical land remained barren.16 In fact, 
once the Mendizábal and Espartero confiscation cycle had been completed, 
the new crops would be grown on lower quality lands and average yields 
tended to decrease, especially cereal crops. The data provided by Gabriel 
Tortella in a recent synthesis of contemporary economic history, indicate 
that the last stage in which assets belonging to the clergy were sold for a 
considerable amount, 1858-1867 (1,253 million reales compared with 
3,447 million reales in 1836-1844), coincides with the period during which 
the production of wheat per inhabitant reached a peak, in the 19th century.17 
Tortella stresses the fact that, as well as the changes affecting property, 
other innovations, such as the construction of the railway system or the 
increase in population, could have influenced the increases in agricultural 
production and productivity. However, the information available seems to 
confirm that the alienation of previously entailed properties -without 
forgetting the abolition of the nobility’s entailed estates (mayorazgos), 
leading to changes in properties previously held by the nobility-, and the 
                                                          
13 Sardá (1987), pp. 243-248. 
14 For a more detailed review of these changes, see Tedde (1994). 
15 Tortella (1994), pp. 51-54. 
16 Anes (1970), pp. 235-263. 
17 Tortella (1994), pp. 44-54. 
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disappearance of the Mesta, must have had a positive impact on the 
efficiency of the Spanish economy. 
The fact that all citizens were equal before the law and before the courts, 
proclaimed by the Cortes of Cádiz, led to a reduction in transaction costs, 
by simplifying the procedures for claiming contractual obligations and 
universalizing the legal authorities responsible for resolving litigation. 
Thus, the end of entailed estates (mayorazgos) probably resulted in a 
reduction in transaction costs, by speeding up the procedures in claims 
before the courts involving the debts of those belonging to the nobility. 
Specifically, in cases of suspension of payments of former holders of 
entailed assets, creditors were able to exercise their rights more quickly and 
with greater guarantees as a result of the liberal reform.18 
However, the concept of equality before the law and the courts was 
sometimes more theoretical than real. This can be seen by the way in which 
the seigniorial regime was dismantled. In Spain, seigniorial estates became 
free property; a property now belonged to the former seigneur of the estate 
while jurisdictional rights over the estate disappeared, with the State taking 
over, thus bringing to an end the obligation to provide payments and 
services. Miguel Artola explained the lengthy series of social conflicts and 
lawsuits caused by this institutional change. On the one hand, there were 
cases in which the former lord claimed communal and vacant property as 
private property. On the other hand, attempts were made to confuse the 
benefits derived from the jurisdictional rights with the payment of land rent, 
characteristic of the rental system.19 Salvador de Moxó, in a book that deals 
with the dissolution of the seigniorial regime in Spain, notes that, on the old 
seigniorial jurisdictional estates, farmers often went from being hereditary 
cultivators and permanent owners of their farms to becoming temporary 
tenant farmers. In this way, not only was the obligation to make payments 
to the former lord, now the owner of the allegedly leased lands, maintained, 
but the legal link between the farmer and his land was broken, opening up 
the possibility of being displaced from the cultivated land.20 In other words, 
following the disappearance of seigniorial jurisdictional estates, peasants 
who should have become the legal owners of their land became mere 
tenants, lacking the security of perpetual ownership and without the powers 
derived from ownership, such as those of selling or transferring the 
property. Conflicts between lords and peasant communities were brought 
before the courts and tribunals, dragging on, in many cases, for decades. 
Moxó points out that jurisprudence usually favoured the former owners of 
estates or their successors. The same author highlights the fact that some of 
                                                          
18 Tedde (1988), p. 39. 
19 Artola (1978), pp. 171-174 and 225-227. 
20 Moxó (1965), p. 86. 
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the decisions which went against the interests of the peasants were made 
during periods with a liberal government characterized as revolutionary or 
radical, such as the period 1868-1874. The debates on agrarian reform, 
during the years of the Second Republic, featured many old peasant 
grievances regarding this cause. Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz refers to the 
"enormous fraud that was committed in the mid-19th century, a fraud that 
was supported by the Spanish Courts".21 
The fact that the judicial system favoured the interests of the former 
lords distorted the hypothetical legal equality of all citizens and resulted in 
the alienation of large sections of society from the liberal regime and even 
in the political radicalization among peasants.22 Antonio Miguel Bernal 
recently highlighted the differences, on this issue, between the dissolution 
of the seigniorial regime in Spain and the French model of liberal reform. 
This author underlines the fact that the Spanish process was very slow, and 
the appearance of sequels more than a century after it had been concluded.23 
This leads us on to another of the characteristic transformations of the 
Spanish liberal reform: the redefinition of property rights. The security 
provided by property rights, enshrined in law and protected from arbitrary 
acts or external interference, should have encouraged investment and 
therefore increased productivity. This phenomenon should have occurred 
even more clearly when the new owners enjoyed plentiful resources, as 
Richard Herr explained for the cases of land disentailment he researched.24 
On the contrary, poorly defined property rights, in both the case of 
communal property and that of individual farms, over an extended period 
of time, would have the opposite effect, discouraging investment, 
especially that of a costly nature and, therefore, keeping productivity below 
potential levels. 
In Spain, the adoption of rules favouring trade fluidity and providing 
security to investors, and in general to those involved in market activity 
because they tend to reduce transaction costs, took place relatively early. It 
is significant that during the last decade of Fernando VII's reign - in the 
midst, then, of an anti-liberal reaction - a series of regulations aimed at 
facilitating trade and productive innovations was announced. In 1826 the 
patent system was regulated.25 In 1829 the first Commercial Code, 
establishing a jurisdiction that affected all trade activity regardless of the 
condition of the parties was published, and trade records were established. 
                                                          
21 Sánchez-Albornoz (1932), p. 19. 
22 Fontana (1974), pp. 162-165 and Nadal (1975), pp. 62-67. 
23 Bernal (1994), pp. 76-84. 
24 Hérr (1974) and (1991). 
25 Sáiz González (1993). 
 
PEDRO TEDDE 
10                    Revista de Historia Económica / Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 
(2020) 
 
In the same year, the Banco de San Fernando was founded in the capital of 
the kingdom, and two years later the Madrid Stock Exchange commenced 
its activity. Without a doubt, these two institutions were created with the 
main objective of obtaining financial resources for the State, but, even to a 
limited extent, this situation facilitated the exchange of financial assets and 
the generation of means of payment. As happened for decades in the mid-
20th century, an anti-liberal political regime was able to coexist with the 
introduction of rules favouring market activity. It cannot be ruled out, in 
either case, that those first steps on the path of economic freedom and 
equality in the market finally required deeper institutional changes. On the 
other hand, the survival of regional legal systems until the end of the 19th 
century brought higher levels of transaction costs than in other countries. 
However, special norms of general scope, such as the Mortgage Law of 
1861, were included in the aspects of the civil law of a more economic 
nature. In this line, the unification of the monetary system and that of 
weights and measures should also be mentioned. 
Likewise, when taking into account the transaction and information 
costs which the State could have reduced, we must also consider the relative 
slowness in the construction of railways in Spain; this meant that clear 
physical difficulties for market relations persisted for several decades.26 
The poor public education system in Spain, lagging behind other European 
countries, must also have resulted in low levels in the formation of human 
capital and in the persistence of entry barriers affecting technical 
innovation, investment, and the market.27 
Thirdly, the poor allocation of resources for the administration of justice 
-with clear effects on the resolution of economic conflicts- is evident if we 
observe how spending in this area, in proportional terms, rose by only half 
of the increase in total public spending between 1845 and 1860. And that 
happened after the period between 1830 and 1840 when total spending 
decreased in absolute terms.28 
We now turn our attention to the liberal reform of the tax system and 
public spending policy. Firstly, as Enrique Fuentes Quintana, Miguel 
Artola and Francisco Comín, among others, observed, the modernization of 
the tax system in Spain clearly took place rather slowly; during almost the 
whole of the first half of the 19th century a fiscal situation reminiscent of 
the Ancien Régime persisted.29 Following the reform of 1845 - which was 
                                                          
26 Artola (dir.) (1978), Gómez Mendoza (1982). 
27 Núñez (1992). 
28 Comín (1985). 
29 Artola (1986), Fuentes Quintana (1990), Comín (1988) and (1990). 
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to remain almost unchanged, in essence, for more than half a century - 
problems such as insufficiency, rigidity and lack of equity in the 
distribution of the tax burden became clear.30 The oligarchic character of 
19th-century Spanish society, observed clearly in the reform of the 
seigniorial regime as previously mentioned, was also present in the design 
of the fiscal system. It was easier for those with most power to evade part 
of their tax obligations, given the way the principal tax (on agricultural 
production and real estate) was structured. In addition to this situation, 
some highly productive economic activities were hardly affected by taxes. 
Likewise, the relative weight of indirect taxation, generally seen as more 
regressive than its direct counterpart, was very high. This resulted in a 
situation of chronic budgetary deficit, the need for State indebtedness and, 
as became clear over time, high levels of fraud. The need to pay high 
amounts of interest on the debt each year meant that other areas of public 
spending were limited to relatively modest proportions in comparison with 
other European countries. The negative consequences for economic 
modernization are obvious.31 It should be pointed out, at this point, that the 
Spanish case is not unique. As Gabriel Tortella observed, the liberal system 
in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy) during the 19th century and the 
first half of the 20th century, was fragile and poorly constructed. The 
financial system of the State is one of the aspects in which such deficiencies 
are seen most clearly. In Southern Europe the oligarchic nature of political 
organization meant that the vast majority of society was excluded from 
collective decision-making. Furthermore, the low productivity of the 
economy, the fact that most of the population lived in rural locations, and 
the low levels of per capita income made it difficult to access information 
and political decision-making centres. There was, then, an interaction 
between slow economic growth and a defective political system.32 
We can conclude by remembering that in Spain, as in other southern 
European countries, the pace of economic modernization during the 19th 
century was too slow; it was not until well into the 20th century that these 
economies were able to approach the levels of northern economies. Factors 
such as the Mediterranean climate and the excessive altitude of many 
agricultural areas, the lack of good entrepreneurs, and the almost total lack 
of integration of industry in foreign markets have been cited as lying behind 
the backwardness of the Spanish economy. Institutional causes related to 
the circumstances mentioned in this paper also played a part. In Spain, as 
in other nations, the results of the liberal reform as regards its effects on 
economic modernization, were contradictory. Neither information nor 
                                                          
30 Fuentes Quintana (1990), Tedde (1984). 
31 Tedde (1985), Comín (1988). 
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transaction costs were reduced by appropriate amounts, property rights 
remained poorly defined for a long period, and the financial organization 
of the State did not respond to the needs of the new society. This is not to 
say that the liberal revolution should not have taken place or that its 
influence on the economy was totally negative. Spain’s 19th-century liberal 
reform probably had more positive than negative consequences; this should 
not cover up the defects and deficiencies of some institutional changes. 
Similarly, economic change did take place, albeit at an excessively slow 
rate. Gradual economic growth, then, took place alongside an incomplete 
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